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Abstract
Social networks are known to influence migration decisions, but connections between
individuals can hardly be observed. We rely on individual-level surveys conducted
by Gallup in 147 countries that provide information on migration intentions and on
the existence of distance-one connections for all respondents in each of the potential
countries of intended destination. The origin-specific distribution of distance-one con-
nections from Gallup closely mirrors the actual distribution of migrant stocks across
countries, and bilateral migration intentions appear to be significantly correlated with
actual flows. This unique data source allows estimating origin-specific conditional logit
models that shed light on the value of having a friend in a given country on the at-
tractiveness of that destination. The validity of the distributional assumptions that
underpin the estimation is tested, and concerns about the threats to identification
posed by unobservables are substantially mitigated.
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1 Introduction
Social networks are expected to exert a key influence on migration decisions: connections
with individuals that have already moved contribute to improve job prospects at destination
(Munshi, 2003; Patel and Vella, 2013) and they can reduce the multifaceted costs of crossing
a border (Carrington et al., 1996), while networks at origin can reduce the incentives to move
(Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016). The existing empirical evidence on the effects of networks
at destination on migration is based on rather coarse measures of networks, such as the
share of households with a migrant at the village (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010) or at the
county level (Bertoli, 2010), or the size of the diaspora in each destination country (see, for
instance, Pedersen et al., 2008; Beine et al., 2011, 2015; Beine and Salomone, 2013; Bertoli
and Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2015). The implicit assumption behind this approach, which
reflects binding data constraints, is that all potential migrants equally benefit from the
networks at destination.1 This assumption is at odds with theoretical representations of
social networks (see Jackson, 2010) and with the empirical evidence on how members of a
migrant network interact with each other (Comola and Mendola, 2015).
Our objective is to contribute to gaining a deeper understanding of how social networks
influence international migration by using a dataset that provides unique information on the
individual-level connections to networks in each potential destination. Specifically, we draw
on the data from 419 surveys conducted by Gallup in 147 countries of the world between
2007 and 2011 (see Gallup, 2013). For each respondent, we have information on whether
she has relatives or friends who reside abroad, as well as on the countries in which they
reside.2 Reassuringly, the geographical distribution of distance-one connections for each
country closely matches the actual bilateral distribution of migrants across destinations for
2010.
We combine the information on the countries in which a respondent has a distance-one
1The estimation of gravity equations derived from underlying random utility maximization models on
aggregate data has to rest on this assumption, as the equivalence of the estimates obtained on aggregate
and on individual-level data depends on the absence of individual-specific regressors (Guimaraes et al.,
2003); Munshi (2016) reviews additional concerns related to the identification of network effects from gravity
equations on aggregate data on bilateral migration flows.
2This destination-specific dimension of the information is what distinguishes the data that we use from
the dataset on internal Chinese migration used by Giulietti et al. (2014), who have information about whether
each individual has a friend residing in an (unspecified) Chinese urban area.
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connection with information on whether she intends to migrate and, if this is the case, to
which destination. The Gallup World Polls do not provide information about actual moves,
but we provide econometric evidence that the bilateral number of intending migrants by year
is significantly associated with the yearly scale of actual bilateral migration flows to OECD
destinations.3
A few studies have so far relied on the Gallup World Polls to investigate the patterns
and determinants of migration intentions, without using the information about the preferred
destination. Specifically, Esipova et al. (2011) present a detailed descriptive analysis of mi-
gration intentions; Manchin et al. (2014) analyze the effect of individual satisfaction on the
desire to migrate, while Dustmann and Okatenko (2014) evidence that the relationship be-
tween the intention to move (either internally or across borders) and wealth is non-monotonic.
Docquier et al. (2015) and Delogu et al. (2015) have used the origin-specific proportion of
the individuals who intend to move to each foreign destination in their analyses of the short-
and long-run efficiency gains of a removal of the legal restrictions to migration, assuming
that the answers to the hypothetical questions in the Gallup World Polls are informative
about the scale of liberalized migration flows. Docquier et al. (2014) empirically analyze the
country-specific and dyadic factors governing the size and the composition of the bilateral
pool of intending migrants, as well as the probability that these intentions are realized.
We estimate, separately for each of the 147 countries in our sample, a conditional logit
model that describes the choice of intending migrants among the alternative destinations
and that controls for the dependency of location-specific utility on the size of the diaspora.
The estimation reveals that having a distance-one connection in a country is, on average,
associated with an increase in the relative odds of opting for that destination by six to eight
times, conditional upon intending to migrate. Distance-one connections have a relatively
small effect compared to the dispersion in the deterministic component of location-specific
utility of all countries in the choice set that are implied by our estimates, but main destina-
tions are characterized by a similar level of attractiveness, so that distance-one connections
can tilt the balance among them.
Our estimation approach is exposed to the threats to identification posed by correlated
peer effects, i.e., unobserved factors that influence both the geographical distribution of
3Creighton (2013), Dustmann and Okatenko (2014), Chort (2014), Manchin et al. (2014) and Docquier et
al. (2014) also provide empirical evidence on the relationship between stated intentions and actual migration.
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one’s own peers and the attractiveness of the various potential destinations, which would
also jeopardize the distributional assumptions that justify the estimation of a conditional
logit model. We follow two distinct and complementary approaches to address the concerns
that our evidence about the key role played by distance-one connections in determining
the preferred intended destinations is just reflecting correlated peer effects.4 Specifically,
we (i) add further individual-level variables drawn from the Gallup World Polls, and (ii)
re-estimate the model on suitably restricted choice sets. Although we cannot fully dismiss
the concerns related to the effects of unobservables on our estimates, the results from the
various alternative specifications that we bring to the data greatly help to substantially
mitigate them.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the data from
the Gallup World Polls. Section 3 briefly describes the random utility model that describes
the location-decision problem that intending migrants face. Section 4 contains some basic
descriptive statistics, and Section 5 presents the benchmark estimates, and it discusses a
number of threats to identification. Finally, Section 6 draws the main conclusions.
2 The Gallup World Polls
Our analysis rests on individual-level data from 147 countries where at least one Gallup
World Poll has been conducted between 2007 and 2011.5 The surveys conducted by Gallup
typically have a sample of around 1,000 randomly selected respondents per country, and the
data are collected either through face-to-face interviews or through phone calls in countries
where at least 80 percent of the population has a telephone land-line.
2.1 Intending migrants
The Gallup World Polls include two related questions on the intention to migrate, asked in
all countries between 2007 and 2011: (i) “Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like
to move to another country, or would you prefer to continue living in this country?”, and
4The Gallup World Polls do not provide information on the entire network, so that we do not have
information on the geographical distribution of distance-two connections, which might have otherwise been
used in the estimation to correct for the possible endogeneity of distance-one connections.
5Further details on the data source can be found in Section 4.1 below; for a description of the methodology
and codebook, see Gallup (2013).
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(ii) “To which country would you like to move?” for the individuals who provide a positive
answer to question (i). We refer to the individuals who express their intention to leave their
country of residence as intending migrants.6
Figure 1: Share of intending migrants and income per capita
Notes: The figure plots the percentage of natives aged 15 to 49 intending to migrate from each country
against the logarithm of real GDP per capita in 2010; data from the Gallup World Polls are pooled across
different waves of the survey, and sampling weights are used; the surface of each circle is proportional to the
size of the native population residing in each country.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Gallup World Polls and World Bank (2015a,b).
The average of the share of intending migrants, weighted by the size of the native resident
population, stands at 21.1 percent.7 The ten countries with the highest shares of intending
migrants among natives are either Sub-Saharan African or Latin American and Caribbean
countries, with the Dominican Republic (65.9 percent) recording the largest share, followed
6The way in which this kind of hypothetical questions is interpreted might vary across countries, as ob-
served by Clemens and Pritchett (2016), which is why we only use within-country variation in the estimation.
7Country-specific figures are aggregated using weights corresponding to the native population in each
country in 2010, computed from World Bank (2015a,b), i.e., the size of the resident population minus the
total number of foreign-born residents. Ideally, we would have used figures for the population aged 15 to 49,
but these are not available neither for the resident population nor for the immigrant stocks. World Bank
(2015a) does not provide an estimate of the total foreign-born population in Taiwan and in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories, which we thus set to zero.
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by Sierra Leone (63.5), Haiti (62.8) and Guyana (62.1). Four out of the ten countries with
the lowest shares of intending migrants are Gulf countries, namely Bahrain (2.6 percent),
United Arab Emirates (4.5), Saudi Arabia (4.7) and Qatar (6.9).8 The share of natives that
intend to migrate declines with income per capita, as shown in Figure 1, with the bivariate
correlation between the two variables standing at -0.265.
Table 1: Distribution of intending migrants by destination country
Share of intending migrants (percent)
Destination World Africa America Asia Europe Oceania
United States 29.33 24.65 25.98 33.34 13.99 22.94
United Kingdom 7.94 10.55 8.73 6.86 9.87 22.11
Canada 6.48 5.49 9.07 5.98 7.29 14.23
France 5.66 10.46 6.46 4.24 6.81 4.78
Australia 4.40 0.79 2.63 5.31 6.07 6.57
Saudi Arabia 4.38 6.83 0.00 5.38 0.24 0.36
Japan 4.24 1.12 3.53 5.60 0.75 2.16
Germany 3.78 3.45 4.24 2.65 11.25 0.85
United Arab Emirates 2.94 2.32 0.01 4.08 0.46 0.86
Spain 2.89 2.29 12.09 0.29 8.17 1.26
South Korea 2.81 0.01 0.03 4.44 0.01 0.00
Singapore 2.76 0.01 0.00 4.35 0.08 1.49
Italy 2.63 3.61 5.15 1.54 4.89 2.47
Switzerland 1.49 0.47 1.24 1.56 2.98 0.00
Malaysia 1.37 0.16 0.00 2.13 0.07 0.12
Russia 1.36 0.28 0.22 1.77 1.85 0.51
China 0.82 1.02 1.34 0.74 0.26 0.75
Sweden 0.75 0.42 0.44 0.60 2.69 1.05
South Africa 0.73 4.95 0.23 0.08 0.17 1.70
New Zealand 0.73 0.07 0.10 0.83 1.79 4.60
Total top-20 87.47 78.96 81.49 91.77 79.67 88.81
Note: Share of intending migrations aged 15 to 49 across the top-20 countries of
destination (defined at the world level), for the whole world and for each continent;
data are pooled across countries and waves of the survey, and sampling weights
are used to compute the distribution.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Gallup World Polls.
Table 1 reports the distribution of intending migrants across the top-20 countries of
destination.9 The natives aged 15 to 49 in our sample intend to migrate towards 185 different
8India (6.7 percent), Thailand (9.4), Indonesia (10.7), China (11.1), Laos (11.4) and Malaysia (11.7) are
the other countries with the lowest shares of intended migrants.
9The respondents in each of the 147 countries in our sample differ with respect to the number of countries
they intend to move to; on average, respondents in each country report 33.6 intended destinations, ranging
from six for Trinidad and Tobago to 78 for Chad (see Table 2).
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countries in the world, with a (highly) uneven distribution of intending migrants across
(intended) destinations. Specifically, 29.3 percent of the individuals in our sample intend to
migrate to the United States, followed by the United Kingdom (7.9), Canada (6.5), France
(5.7) and Australia (4.8), with the first five (intended) destinations totaling 53.8 percent of
the preferences of intending migrants. The top-20 intended destinations are chosen by around
87.5 percent of all intending migrants, while the total share of the 95 countries at the bottom
of the list stands at just 1.0 percent. The (pooled) distribution of intending migrants across
countries is closely and positively correlated with the distribution of actual migrant stocks,
but it is more concentrated than the latter.10 Table 1 also reveals the existence of relevant
variations across continents in the distribution of intending migrants across destinations,
although the top-20 destinations, defined at the world level, account for no less than 79.0
percent of migration intentions in each continent.
A reasonable concern might be that the answers to the hypothetical questions on migra-
tion intentions asked by Gallup are not informative about actual migration decisions. The
OECD International Migration Database provides us with yearly data about the size of ac-
tual bilateral gross bilateral migration flows for 34 of the 185 destination countries mentioned
as preferred destinations by the respondents to the Gallup World Polls.11 Econometric anal-
yses, presented in the Appendix A.1, reveal that bilateral migration intentions do contain
relevant information about the size of actual bilateral migration flows.
2.2 Distance-one connections in the intended destinations
The questionnaire of the Gallup World Polls also includes the following question: (iii) “Do
you have relatives or friends who are living in another country whom you can count on to
help you when you need them, or not?”. For the individuals who answer affirmatively to
this question, the data provide (iv) information on up to three countries of residence of these
relatives or friends.12 Thus, questions (iii) and (iv) give us information about up to three
10The first five intended destinations, which account for 53.8 percent of all intending migrants, hosted
35.9 percent of the actual migrants from the origin countries in our sample in 2010 according to World Bank
(2015a).
11These 33 countries represent the preferred destination for 76.8 percent of the our sample of natives aged
15 to 49 who intend to migrate.
12The questionnaire also includes the following question: “Have any members of your household gone
to live in a foreign country permanently or temporarily in the past five years?”, with information on the
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countries in which each individual is directly connected to someone who could provide help
to him or her.13 58 percent of the individuals who provide an affirmative answer to question
(iii) report a distance-one connection in just one country, and 24 percent of them in two
countries. This implies that for 82 percent of the respondents the limit of three countries
in question (iv) is certainly not binding, so that we observe in the data all the countries in
which they have a distance-one connection with relatives or friends, while the limit might be
binding for (a part of) the 18 percent the respondents that report three countries. Thus, the
Gallup World Polls give us information about the foreign countries in which each individual
has at least one distance-one connection.
Notice that a respondent might have more than one distance-one connection in each
of the countries that he or she reports, and that the distance-one connections might refer
to individuals who are not born in the same country as the respondent. Keeping these two
caveats in mind, it is interesting to compare the origin-specific distribution of the distance-one
connections from the Gallup World Polls, conducted around the year 2010, with the actual
distribution of its migrants across destinations in 2010 from World Bank (2015a). For each
country j, we compute the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the distributions
of distance-one connections and actual migrants. This coefficient is always positive, and
significantly so for 142 out of 144 countries,14 and its (weighted) average stands at 0.519,
with a standard deviation of 0.099.15 The high value of the Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient is reassuring with respect to the fact that the data coming out of the Gallup
World Polls match well with the distribution of actual migrants across destinations.
country of residence for those who provide an affirmative answer, but only for 287 out of 419 surveys; we do
not employ this question in the analysis to avoid a substantial reduction in the sample size.
13Notice that questions (iii) and (iv) are asked in the Gallup World Polls before enquiring about the
intentions to migrate, so that this dismisses the concern that respondents might be more likely to report a
distance-one connection in the destination they intend to move to.
14We do not have data on bilateral migrant stocks for the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Serbia and
Taiwan from World Bank (2015a); the countries for which the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is not
significantly different from zero at the 1 percent confindence level are Bahrain (p-value 0.096) and Namibia
(0.025).
15Similar evidence is obtained when relying on the Pearson’s correlation coefficient.
8
3 The location-decision problem of intending migrants
Consider an individual i residing in country j, who has to select her preferred location from
a choice set D. The utility that this individual would obtain from locating in country k ∈ D
is given by:
Uijk = Vijk + εijk, (1)
where Vijk ≡ xijk ′βjk represents the deterministic component of utility, net of moving costs,
and εijk is a stochastic term. If εijk follows an independently and identically distributed
Extreme Value Type-1 distribution, with F (x) = e−e
−x
, then the probability that country k
represents the utility-maximizing choice is given by (McFadden, 1974):






The separate estimation of a conditional logit model for each origin j allows us to recover the
vectors of parameters βjk. We model the deterministic component of utility as depending
on a dummy variable dijk that signals whether the j-born individual i has a distance-one
connection to destination k, and we denote by β1jk = β1j, ∀k ∈ D, the parameter associated
to dijk.
The choice set over which we estimated (2) does not include the origin j itself, because
the variable dijk cannot be properly defined when k = j, so that our estimation is restricted
to the sub-sample of individuals stating an intention to migrate. Notice that the estimation
on the choice set Dj ≡ D/{j} entails that our estimation is consistent with the distributional
assumptions introduced by Bertoli et al. (2013) and Ortega and Peri (2013), who allow for
a common variance component of the stochastic term εijk across all countries but the origin,
which reflects unobserved individual heterogeneity in the preferences for migration, as this
component does not influence the choice of the preferred option in Dj.
16
The estimation of (2) rests on the independence of irrelevant alternatives property within
the choice set Dj, which implies that the relative probability of choosing between two al-
ternative options in Dj depends exclusively on the attractiveness of these two options, i.e.,
ln(pijk)− ln(pijh) = Vijk−Vijh, and it is independent from the presence of other alternatives
16“The allocation of actual migrants by distance migrated should be relatively free of the influence of
psychic costs, although the percentage of all persons who become migrants is not.” (Sjaastad, 1962, p. 85).
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in the choice set Dj.
17 An implication of this property is that the estimated coefficients
should be stable when the choice set Dj is modified, as otherwise the relative choice proba-
bilities would be altered. We thus re-estimate (2) on a series of restricted choice sets Rnj that
are obtained by dropping sets of destinations from Dj, comparing the estimated coefficient
β̂
Rnj
1j obtained on the subsample R
n
j ⊂ Dj with the point estimate β̂1j obtained from the
estimation on the entire choice set Dj.
18 More specifically, for each country j we compute
the share of the estimations conducted on the restricted samples Rnj for which we do not





The Gallup World Polls cover the entire civilian, non-institutionalized population aged 15
years and above, with a sample of around 1,000 individuals in each wave of the survey. As
discussed in Section 2 above, we restrict our sample to natives aged 15 to 49 who intend
to migrate abroad.20 The number of individuals included in the sample for each of the 147
countries depends on the number of waves of the Gallup World Polls conducted between
2007 and 2011, the share of foreign-born individuals residing in each country, and the share
of intending migrants in each country. Table 2 reports the number of waves of the Gallup
World Polls for each country, together with the number of intending migrants among the
natives aged 15 to 49 and the number of intended destinations. The total sample size is
86,875 intending migrants, which corresponds to an average of 591 per country, with the
sample size varying between 29 (Bahrain) and 2,006 (Senegal).
17We should recall here that the independence of irrelevant alternatives is a property of the specification
of the model that is estimated, rather than an inherent feature of the choice situation, and it depends on
the extent to which observables allow capturing heterogeneity across individuals; Bertoli and Fernández-
Huertas Moraga (2013, 2015) provide evidence that this property is violated in specifications estimated on
aggregate data that assume that the deterministic component of utility is not individual-specific, while we
relax this assumption in (2).
18See, for instance, Head et al. (1995) and Grogger and Hanson (2011).
19See Section 5.2 for more details.
20Foreign-born individuals are likely to have some unobserved characteristics, such as the proficiency in
their mother tongue, that could be correlated both with the geographical distribution of their distance-one
connections, and with the choice of their intended destination; 28.1 percent of the foreign-born intending
migrants report their country of birth as their preferred destination, and 42.8 percent of them have a
distance-one connection there.
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Table 2: Sample size and number of intended destinations
Country Waves Obs. Dest. Country Waves Obs. Dest.
Algeria 2 279 22 Tunisia 3 517 33
Angola 1 189 23 Uganda 3 1310 50
Benin 1 125 28 Zambia 3 746 47
Botswana 2 586 39 Zimbabwe 3 1349 51
Burkina Faso 2 646 39 Argentina 3 458 33
Burundi 2 258 26 Belize 1 113 21
Cameroon 4 1858 59 Bolivia 4 998 32
Central African Republic 1 464 36 Brazil 2 320 30
Chad 4 999 78 Canada 3 198 41
Comoros 2 539 33 Chile 3 759 38
Congo (Kinshasa) 1 377 32 Colombia 4 1173 33
Congo Brazzaville 1 426 32 Costa Rica 3 596 31
Djibouti 3 589 39 Dominican Republic 4 1740 32
Egypt 2 315 24 Ecuador 3 521 28
Ghana 3 1432 44 El Salvador 4 1545 33
Guinea 1 366 28 Guatemala 4 979 31
Ivory Coast 1 274 24 Guyana 1 216 19
Kenya 3 1473 58 Haiti 2 429 34
Liberia 3 1579 46 Honduras 4 1426 30
Libya 1 209 16 Mexico 3 530 36
Madagascar 1 184 16 Nicaragua 4 1546 28
Malawi 1 370 23 Panama 3 530 30
Mali 3 850 46 Paraguay 2 206 17
Mauritania 4 776 46 Peru 4 1420 39
Morocco 2 408 20 Trinidad and Tobago 1 65 6
Mozambique 1 232 22 United States 2 185 31
Namibia 1 157 26 Uruguay 4 365 28
Niger 4 850 45 Venezuela 3 296 30
Nigeria 4 1912 55 Afghanistan 4 1030 41
Rwanda 2 227 29 Armenia 4 931 33
Senegal 4 2006 42 Azerbaijan 4 729 32
Sierra Leone 2 1104 36 Bahrain 2 29 12
Somalia 2 668 35 Bangladesh 4 1230 45
South Africa 4 666 46 Cambodia 4 1278 28
Sudan 2 489 41 China 3 1072 37
Tanzania 3 985 59 Georgia 4 725 34
Togo 1 229 27 Hong Kong 2 225 26
(continued)
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Table 2: Sample size and number of intended destinations (continued)
Country Waves Obs. Dest. Country Waves Obs. Dest.
India 4 1052 31 Bulgaria 2 235 24
Indonesia 4 315 24 Croatia 4 281 25
Iran 2 512 34 Cyprus 2 230 28
Iraq 2 274 26 Czech Republic 3 264 34
Israel 4 419 33 Denmark 4 376 46
Japan 7 634 44 Estonia 3 373 29
Jordan 3 498 39 Finland 2 221 42
Kazakhstan 4 495 32 France 3 367 51
Kyrgyzstan 4 861 35 Germany 4 554 54
Laos 2 170 18 Greece 3 317 31
Lebanon 3 529 42 Hungary 3 448 32
Malaysia 4 342 30 Iceland 1 85 14
Mongolia 2 722 28 Ireland 3 293 23
Nepal 4 666 35 Italy 3 464 39
Occupied Palestinian Territory 3 427 33 Latvia 3 337 31
Pakistan 5 493 34 Lithuania 4 670 32
Philippines 4 1011 39 Luxembourg 2 179 29
Qatar 1 39 20 Macedonia 4 742 41
Russia 5 1435 57 Malta 2 286 26
Saudi Arabia 3 103 26 Moldova 4 1159 39
Singapore 5 533 30 Netherlands 2 206 33
South Korea 4 941 39 Norway 1 95 27
Sri Lanka 4 723 34 Poland 4 482 39
Syria 3 456 43 Portugal 3 361 35
Taiwan 2 486 33 Romania 3 480 31
Tajikistan 4 635 24 Serbia and Montenegro 4 1949 51
Thailand 3 204 31 Slovakia 1 209 21
Turkmenistan 1 169 20 Slovenia 2 204 31
United Arab Emirates 2 37 14 Spain 3 302 35
Uzbekistan 3 431 24 Sweden 3 401 44
Vietnam 2 292 20 Switzerland 1 56 25
Yemen 2 441 25 Turkey 3 393 51
Albania 4 974 26 Ukraine 4 692 42
Austria 3 205 35 United Kingdom 4 677 54
Belarus 4 693 42 Australia 2 204 29
Belgium 3 285 39 New Zealand 2 221 27
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4 687 35
Notes: We report the number of waves of Gallup World Polls conducted in each country between 2007 and
2011, the number of natives aged 15 to 49 who intend to migrate and the number of intended destinations.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Gallup World Polls.
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38.0 percent of the 86,875 intending migrants in our sample have a distance-one con-
nection in at least one foreign country, and 20.3 percent of the intending migrants have a
distance-one connection in the destination they intend to move to.
5 Estimation
The specification of the conditional logit model that we bring to the data includes: (i) a
dummy variable dijk that signals whether the individual i has a distance-one connection in
destination k; (ii) dyadic dummies djk that absorb the effect of all time-invariant dyadic
(such as distance or linguistic proximity), origin or destination-specific variables, (iii) a vector
zij of individual characteristics, including sex, four age cohorts,
21 and a dummy that takes
the value one for individuals who completed at least nine years of education.22 Importantly,
notice that the inclusion of dyadic dummies djk also controls for the influence exerted by
the size of the diaspora of j-born individuals in destination k on the choice of the (intended)
destination, as this variable mostly evolves slowly over time, if this enters additively in the
function that describes the deterministic component of location-specific utility Vijk in (1).
23
The empirical specification is thus consistent with the econometric evidence provided with
aggregate data by Beine et al. (2011) on the role of the size of the bilateral diaspora in
shaping actual migration flows.24
The conditional logit model is estimated separately for each of the 147 countries in our
sample. Letting Nj ≡ #Dj, the estimation of the conditional logit model requires estimating
one coefficient of the alternative-specific variable dijk plus six times Nj − 1 coefficients for
the individual-specific variables and the destination-specific intercepts, i.e., a total of 1 +
21Specifically, 15 to 19, 20 to 29, 30 to 39 and 40 to 49 years.
22The Gallup World Polls allow to distinguish three levels of education: up to eight years of schooling,
from nine to 15 years, i.e., up to three years of post-secondary education, and completed tertiary education;
our results are robust when including a dummy for each of the three levels, or when pooling together the
two lowest levels education.
23We also present specifications where time-varying dyadic dummies, i.e., djkt, thus controlling also for
variations over time in the size of the diaspora.
24Our specification is actually more general, as it does not require the diaspora to be defined on the basis
of the country of birth; for instance, our specification can allow for the attractiveness of the United States for
potential Ecuadorian migrants to depend on the size of the diaspora of all Spanish-speaking Latin American
migrants residing in the United States.
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6(Nj−1) coefficients. The standard errors for the estimated coefficients are obtained through
bootstrapping (200 replications with replacement).
5.1 Benchmark specification
We focus our attention on the estimated coefficients β̂1j, with j = 1, ..., 147, for our variable of
interest dijk.
25 Figure 2 plots the estimated coefficient for distance-one connections for each
country against the corresponding z-score. The estimated coefficients are always positive
(ranging between 0.28 an 4.49), and significantly different from zero for 130 out of 147
countries, and the z-score falls short of the value that allows rejecting the null hypothesis at
the 1 percent confidence level for countries that (mostly) have a very limited sample size, as
Figure 2 reveals.
Figure 2: Estimated coefficient and z-score for distance-one connections
Notes: The figure plots country-specific point estimates for the coefficient of distance-one connections from
the conditional logit and the corresponding z-score, (see also Table A.2 in the Appendix); the surface of each
circle is proportional to the sample size for each country.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Gallup World Polls and World Bank (2015a,b).
Figure 3 plots the values of the estimated coefficients in a world map, and it reveals that
25The minimal size Nj of the choice set for the countries in our sample is 14 (for Trinidad and Tobago),
and it is thus unfeasible to report the 1 + 6(Nj − 1) ≥ 79 estimated coefficients for each country.
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there is no clear geographical pattern in the values of the estimates for the coefficient of
distance-one connections.26
Figure 3: Estimated coefficients for distance-one connections
Notes: The figure reports the estimates from the conditional logit (see Table A.2 in the Appendix).
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Gallup World Polls.
The average β̂1 of the estimated coefficients stands at 1.850, with a standard deviation
of 0.689. This entails that the relative odds of intending to migrate to destination k over
any other foreign destination for an individual with a distance-one connection in country k
is around six to eight times larger than in the absence of a distance-one connection in k.27
What can we say about the size of the estimated coefficient for distance-one connections?
We cannot provide a direct comparison of our estimates with the effects of traditional de-
terminants of (actual) migration decisions as the specification that we bring to the data
26Similar results are obtained when we estimate the model separately for men and women, or by level of
education, or when we drop the individuals that report having friends and relatives they can count on in three
distinct countries, as our variable of interest is probably measured with error as they might have distance-one
connections in other countries, which would go unrecorded in the Gallup World Polls (see Section 2.2); the
results are available from the authors upon request.
27We have that eβ̂1 ' 6.360, while the average of the exponentiated values of the estimated coefficients
stands at 8.395.
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controls for but does not provide an estimate for the effects of determinants of the attrac-
tiveness of a destination, such as its distance from the origin or the size of the diaspora, that
do not vary across individuals. Still, the attractiveness of the various options in the choice
set can be inferred from the estimated coefficients of the dyadic dummies djk, which reflect
the differences in the deterministic component of location-specific utility,28 and are thus di-
rectly comparable to β̂1j. Given the distributional assumptions that we have introduced, the
origin-specific distribution of the estimated values of the coefficients for the dummies djk
is closely related to the distribution of observed choice probabilities, as the average of the
individual-specific utility Uijk, conditional upon k being the utility-maximizing alternative,
is invariant with k (see de Palma and Kilani, 2007).29 The distribution of migration inten-
tions is very concentrated in a few destinations (see Section 2.1), and this, in turn, entails
that the origin-specific distribution of the estimated coefficients for the dummies djk is very
dispersed. Thus, β̂1j stands, on average, at 4.6 percent of the standard deviation of the
distribution of the estimated coefficients for the dummies djk, so that distance-one connec-
tions are unable to turn an otherwise unattractive destination into the preferred option for
an intending migrant. Still, they do tilt the balance among countries that have a similar
attractiveness, as main destinations do.
Our estimation approach is based on the assumption that the vector xijk is able to mop
up all sources of correlation in utility Uijk across the various options in the choice set. A
violation of this identifying assumption could result in a bias in the estimate of β1j. More
specifically, an unobserved individual characteristic uijk that is positively correlated both
with the dummy variable dijk that signals whether the j-born individual i has a distance-one
connection in k and that contributes to increase the attractiveness of destination k would
induce an upward bias in our estimate of β1j, and it could introduce a correlation in utility
across destinations. For instance, imagine that an intending migrant born in Argentina is
28More precisely, this is true for a woman aged 15 to 19 with no more than eight years of completed edu-
cation; the difference in the deterministic component of utility for the respondents with other characteristics
also depends on the destination-specific coefficients of the vector of individual-specific regressors zij .
29Uijk depends on the deterministic component Vijk and on the stochastic component εijk; if Vijk > Vijl,
then destination k will represent the preferred option for a larger share of j−born intending migrants, and
the average value of εijk for them will be lower than the corresponding average value of εijl for the individuals
who intend to move to l, and this differential exactly offsets the difference between Vijk and Vijl, so that
E(Uijk|Uijk > Uijh , ∀h ∈ D/{k}) = E(Uijl|Uijl > Uijh , ∀h ∈ D/{k}).
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of Italian origins: she is more likely to have a distance-one connection in Italy than other
Argentine-born intending migrants, and she also faces lower legal barriers for migration to
Italy (and to other EU member states), as any foreign-born individual of proven Italian
descent can obtain the Italian citizenship (Law No. 91, February 5, 1992). The resulting
omitted variable bias could produce a positive and significant estimate for β1j even in the
absence of any causal effect, and it would result in a violation of the independence of irrelevant
alternatives property. We thus check whether the specification that we bring to the data
satisfies the IIA property, and we then explicitly deal with threats to our identification
strategy that can be due to a number of plausible unobserved factors.
5.2 Testing for the IIA property
The estimation of the conditional logit model rests on the property of the independence
of irrelevant alternatives, as discussed in Section 3 above. We test whether the estimate
of β̂1j is stable when we re-estimate the model on a restricted choice set. Specifically, for
each estimation on a restricted sample Rnj , we see whether the estimated coefficient β̂
Rnj
1j falls
within the 95 percent confidence interval of β̂1j, i.e., β̂
Rnj
1j ' β̂1j; we then compute the share
of the estimations for which this is actually the case.30 We follow two distinct approaches to
define the restricted samples Rj over which the conditional logit is estimated: (i) we drop
one (intended) destination at a time, as in Grogger and Hanson (2011), so that n = 1, ..., Nj;
(ii) we sort the countries in the choice set Dj in ascending order of the number of intending
migrants, and we drop larger sets of destinations starting from the one with the lowest
number of intending migrants. The second approach is clearly more demanding, as the size
of the restricted sample Rj gets progressively smaller.
31
On average, 98.5 percent of the specifications defined on the basis of the approach de-
scribed at point (i) produce an estimated coefficient for distance-one connections which
belongs to the 95 percent confidence interval of β̂1j. When we follow the more demanding
approach described in (ii) which induces major reductions in the dimension of the choice set
and in the sample size, we find that 90.9 percent of the specifications produce an estimated
30This test requires estimating the conditional logit model more than 12,000 times, which is why we do
not bootstrap standard errors for the specifications estimated on the restricted samples.
31The number of replications in this second approach is not higher than Nj − 2, as the conditional logit
might fail to converge when just a few destinations are included in Rnj .
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coefficient for dijk that lies in the confidence interval of the one obtained from our bench-
mark specification. Both approaches are thus reassuring about the appropriateness of the
IIA property that characterizes the specification of the location-choice model that we have
brought to the data.
5.3 Is our estimate just capturing correlated peer effects?
As discussed above, the estimated effect of distance-one connection might be due to unob-
served variables that are correlated both with our variable of interest and with location-
specific utility. We follow three distinct but complementary approaches to mitigate the con-
cerns that our evidence about the key role played by distance-one connections in determining
the preferred intended destinations is just reflecting correlated peer effects. Specifically, (i)
we add further individual-level variables to the vector zij, and (ii) we re-estimate the model
on a suitably defined set of destinations.32
5.3.1 Inclusion of additional controls
Our benchmark specification includes an origin-destination specific intercept of the deter-
ministic component of utility Vijk. As we pool the data from the Gallup World Polls across
waves, one might be concerned that the attractiveness of destination k for j-born intending
migrants might vary over time, and that these variations could be correlated with the like-
lihood of having a distance-one connection there. For instance, sustained economic growth
in k could both attract more migrants from country j, thus increasing the number of non-
migrants that have a distance-one connection in k, and it could increase the share of j-born
intending migrants for which k represents the preferred destination. We re-estimate the con-
ditional logit model allowing the origin-destination specific intercept to vary with each wave
of the Gallup World Polls:33 the correlation of the ensuing set of coefficients with those from
our benchmark specification stands at 0.992.
We also include additional elements to the vector zij relying on information contained
in the Gallup World Polls. Specifically, we separately add (detailed) dummies for the self-
reported religion of each respondent,34 and an asset index à la Dustmann and Okatenko
32All the results that are discussed but not reported are available from the authors upon request.
33We have more than one wave for 124 out of 147 countries (see Table 2).
34Information about religion is available for 142 out of 147 countries in our sample.
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(2014).35 The first of the two extensions of our benchmark specification allows to dismiss
the concern that religion might influence both individual preferences across destinations and
the geographical distribution of one’s own distance-one connections.36 The second extension
deals with the concern related to a different form of homophily, as an individual is likely to
be mostly connected with other individuals with a similar socio-economic condition, which
could influence the set of destinations that an individual can afford to move to. Allowing
location-specific utility to vary either across religious groups or with the household’s socio-
economic status, as proxied by the asset index, does not result in a significant reduction
in the estimated values of β̂1j, which remain closely correlated with those obtained in the
benchmark specification.
5.3.2 Restrictions of the choice set
A different way to deal with the threats to identification posed by individual-level unobserv-
ables is through suitable restrictions of the choice set. For instance, one might be concerned
that the (unobserved) proficiency in a foreign language influences both the expected returns
from migration to the countries where this language is spoken, and the distribution of one’s
own distance-one connections. We thus restrict the choice set to destinations where English
is (one of) the official language(s).37 English is an official language in seven out of the top-20
intended destinations in Table 2; on average, 46.0 percent of the intending migrants report
an English-speaking country as their preferred destination, and this figure is not lower than
30.0 percent for three out of four countries in our sample.38 The unobserved proficiency in
English, which is potentially correlated with the likelihood of having a distance-one connec-
35Specifically, the asset index is the first principal component computed through an origin-specific poly-
choric principal component analysis on four of the seven questions used by Dustmann and Okatenko (2014)
that are available for all countries in our sample from 2007 to 2011; the questions relate to (i) the ownership
of a TV set, (ii) access to the Internet, to whether in the previous 12 months the respondent did not have
enough money (iii) to buy food or (iv) to provide adequate shelter of housing to her family.
36For instance, a Muslim born in Egypt could be more likely to have distance-one connections in Gulf
countries and to intend to migrate there, while a Coptic Christian born in the same country could be more
likely to have distance-one connections in the United States and to state her intention to move to this
destination.
37The size of the of restricted choice set varies from three (for Egypt, Libya, Qatar and Venezuela) to 25
(for Kenya).
38The corresponding figures are much lower for subsets of destinations that share another official language,
such as Spanish, Arabic or Russian, which prevents the estimation on these restricted choice sets.
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tion in an English-speaking country, cannot influence the choice of the intended destinations
within the restricted choice set of English-speaking destinations. Once again, the results
from our benchmark specification do not appear to be sensitive to this threat to identifica-
tion: the estimated coefficients in the restricted choice set are not systematically lower than
in the entire choice set, where the spurious correlation of dijk with unobserved proficiency in
English could have imparted an upward bias in our estimate of β1j.
The Gallup World Polls provide information on the country of birth of each respondent, so
that we can restrict our sample to native-born only, as discussed in Section 4. Nevertheless,
some of the natives could be of immigrant descent,39 and these individuals might differ from
the rest of the sample in similar unobserved dimensions as foreign-born respondents do. We
thus rely on data from World Bank (2015a) to identify the ten countries with the largest
stock of immigrants residing in country j in 2010, and we exclude these countries from the
choice set of j-born intending migrants.40 Following up on the example introduced in Section
5.1, this criterion ensures that we drop Italy from the choice set of Argentine-born intending
migrants, as Italians are one of the largest immigrant groups in Argentina. This addresses
the threat to identification posed by the fact that natives of immigrant descent might face
lower moving costs–for legal, linguistic or cultural reasons–to the country of origin of their
ancestors, where they are also likely to have a distance-one connection.
The main countries of intended migration can also be the countries of origin of the largest
immigrant stocks for some countries in our sample, so that this criterion at times leads to a
drastic reduction in the sample size that produces outliers in the estimation.41
This restriction in the choice set does not result in a systematic reduction in the estimated
effect of distance-one connections, as the (weighted) correlation of the point estimates with
those from our benchmark specification stands at 0.391.42
39Later waves of the Gallup World Polls allow identifying second-generation immigrants, but they do not
contain information on distance-one connections.
40We obtain similar results when relying on migrant stocks data for earlier decades from Özden et al.
(2011), as the set of main origin countries tends to remain unchanged over time.
41For instance, eight of the ten main countries of origin of the immigrants in Guyana are also among the
top ten countries of intended migration according to the Gallup World Polls, so that less than 8 percent of
its intending migrants belong to the restricted sample.
42As recalled above, World Bank (2015a) does not provide information on bilateral immigrant stocks
for the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Serbia and Taiwan; estimates for five countries (Belize, Guyana,
Iceland, Switzerland and Trinidad and Tobago) with outlying values of the estimated coefficients have been
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6 Concluding remarks
This paper relies on individual-level data from the Gallup World Polls to provide econometric
evidence on the relationship between an individual’s direct connections to the migrant net-
works in different countries and her choice concerning the preferred country of destination.
The data from the Gallup World Polls give us a much finer measure of migrant networks than
those commonly employed in the literature, which allow us to get a deeper understanding of
the way in which networks influence migration decisions.
Distance-one connections appear to be a key driver in the choice among competing des-
tinations with a similar level of attractiveness. The estimated effect is small relative to
the dispersion of the levels of attractiveness of the various countries which are implied by
the identifying assumption that stated preferences among competing destinations reflect an
utility-maximizing behavior. We present various robustness checks which allow to miti-
gate the concern that unobserved individual heterogeneity is driving the estimated effects of
distance-one connections.
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A Appendix
A.1 Intentions to migrate and actual migration
The data from the Gallup World Polls can be aggregated to obtain the number of natives
of country j intending to move to country k in each year in which the survey is conducted,
which we denote as intentionjkt. The OECD International Migration Database provides
us with information about the size of the actual gross bilateral migration flow from j to
k by year, which we denote by flowjkt, for 34 of the 185 destination countries mentioned
as preferred destinations by the respondents to the Gallup World Polls. We can then test
whether the number of intending migrants contains information about the size of actual
bilateral migration flows once we control for a number of origin-specific, destination-specific
or dyadic factors with a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimation. Specifically, we
estimate the following regression:
flowjkt = exp [α ln(intentionjkt) + β
′xjk + djt + dkt + εjkt] (A.1)
where xjk is a vector of dyadic controls including the logarithm of distance, and dummies
for contiguity, common colonial history and a common language, and djt and dkt represent
origin-year and destination-year dummies respectively. We also estimate (A.1) collapsing the
longitudinal dimension of the data,43 and including the logarithm of the size of the bilateral
migration stock as an additional element in xjk, following Beine et al. (2011).
Table A.1 reports the estimates of the various specifications of (A.1): the estimated elas-
ticity of bilateral migration flows with respect to the number of bilateral intending migrants
stands at 0.627-0.800 in the cross-sectional analysis, and at 0.409-0.540 when the longitudi-
nal dimension of the data is used. The estimated elasticity is positive and highly statistically
significant even in the fourth data column of Table A.1, where we control for the time-varying
attractiveness of each destination and for the size of the diaspora. Similar results, reported
in the last two data columns of Table A.1, are obtained when we exclude high-income origin
countries from the sample, as natives of those countries could be better able to turn their
intentions into actual migration episodes.
43The data are collapsed over the (dyad-specific) set of years for which the information on bilateral
migration intentions from the Gallup World Polls is not missing.
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Table A.1: Migration intentions and actual migration flows to OECD destinations
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable flowjk flowjk flowjkt flowjkt flowjkt flowjkt
ln(intentionsjkt) 0.800*** 0.627*** 0.540*** 0.409*** 0.444*** 0.345***
[0.048] [0.038] [0.028] [0.027] [0.032] [0.033]
ln(networksjk) 0.247*** 0.242*** 0.192***
[0.038] [0.022] [0.028]
ln(distancejk) -0.588*** -0.401*** -0.712*** -0.496*** -1.031*** -0.816***
[0.066] [0.060] [0.045] [0.049] [0.056] [0.055]
Contiguityjk 0.585*** 0.372** 0.506*** 0.314*** 1.556*** 1.081***
[0.167] [0.148] [0.095] [0.086] [0.159] [0.154]
Common languagejk 0.318** 0.371*** 0.515*** 0.529*** 0.583*** 0.650***
[0.130] [0.119] [0.073] [0.068] [0.087] [0.091]
Colonyjk 0.308** 0.033 0.348*** 0.065 0.434*** 0.109
[0.132] [0.117] [0.056] [0.061] [0.077] [0.098]
Destination dummies Yes Yes No No No No
Destination-year dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin dummies Yes Yes No No No No
Origin-year dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,512 2,512 4,534 4,534 2,872 2,872
Pseudo-R2 0.854 0.890 0.878 0.907 0.939 0.948
Note: standard errors in brackets; *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5
percent level, * significant at the 10 percent level; the dependent variable in specifications (1)-(2)
is obtained collapsing the variables for each origin-destination pair over time before taking the
logarithmic transformation; specifications (5)-(6) exclude from the sample the origin countries
that are classified as high-income countries by the World Bank.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Gallup World Polls, OECD International Migration Database,
Mayer and Zignago (2011) and Özden et al.(2011).
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A.2 Benchmark estimates
Table A.2: Estimated coefficients for distance-one connections
Country obs. coeff. s.e. Country obs. coeff. s.e.
Algeria 279 1.606 8.425 Tunisia 517 0.725 0.331
Angola 189 1.246 0.324 Uganda 1310 2.261 0.173
Benin 125 1.842 0.527 Zambia 746 1.548 0.192
Botswana 586 1.140 0.174 Zimbabwe 1349 1.422 0.096
Burkina Faso 646 1.444 0.169 Argentina 458 1.773 0.212
Burundi 258 1.111 0.595 Belize 113 1.492 0.453
Cameroon 1858 1.695 0.099 Bolivia 998 1.644 0.103
Central African Republic 464 1.680 0.248 Brazil 320 1.886 0.345
Chad 999 1.789 0.148 Canada 198 2.788 0.420
Comoros 539 0.654 0.232 Chile 759 1.695 0.159
Congo (Kinshasa) 377 2.275 0.250 Colombia 1173 1.344 0.114
Congo Brazzaville 426 1.000 0.241 Costa Rica 596 1.215 0.206
Djibouti 589 1.474 0.169 Dominican Republic 1740 1.143 0.104
Egypt 315 1.469 0.361 Ecuador 521 1.213 0.173
Ghana 1432 1.722 0.155 El Salvador 1545 0.515 0.093
Guinea 366 1.832 0.321 Guatemala 979 0.329 0.137
Ivory Coast 274 1.514 0.333 Guyana 216 1.382 0.324
Kenya 1473 1.522 0.155 Haiti 429 1.374 0.229
Liberia 1579 1.352 0.157 Honduras 1426 0.524 0.126
Libya 209 4.489 11.802 Mexico 530 0.835 0.169
Madagascar 184 0.275 0.808 Nicaragua 1546 1.084 0.086
Malawi 370 0.729 0.294 Panama 530 0.985 0.185
Mali 850 1.799 0.166 Paraguay 206 1.981 0.254
Mauritania 776 2.079 0.192 Peru 1420 1.689 0.106
Morocco 408 2.262 0.225 Trinidad and Tobago 65 1.598 0.744
Mozambique 232 1.351 0.290 United States 185 2.930 0.435
Namibia 157 1.573 0.520 Uruguay 365 1.394 0.216
Niger 850 2.054 0.158 Venezuela 296 2.177 0.318
Nigeria 1912 1.527 0.133 Afghanistan 1030 2.344 0.184
Rwanda 227 1.575 0.422 Armenia 931 1.329 0.133
Senegal 2006 1.460 0.086 Azerbaijan 729 0.906 0.203
Sierra Leone 1104 1.876 0.240 Bahrain 29 3.676 114.676
Somalia 668 2.314 0.155 Bangladesh 1230 1.927 0.148
South Africa 666 3.229 0.448 Cambodia 1278 1.957 0.241
Sudan 489 1.882 0.179 China 1072 1.557 0.215
Tanzania 985 2.694 0.254 Georgia 725 1.677 0.162
Togo 229 1.108 0.349 Hong Kong 225 1.525 0.264
(continued)
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Table A.2: Estimated coefficients for distance-one connections (continued)
Country obs. coeff. s.e. Country obs. coeff. s.e.
India 1052 2.957 0.338 Bulgaria 235 3.028 0.317
Indonesia 315 2.717 0.384 Croatia 281 1.646 0.240
Iran 512 1.972 0.233 Cyprus 230 1.899 0.191
Iraq 274 2.599 0.292 Czech Republic 264 2.318 0.338
Israel 411 2.054 0.256 Denmark 376 2.333 0.223
Japan 634 1.721 0.272 Estonia 373 1.790 0.247
Jordan 498 2.647 0.303 Finland 221 2.009 7.1∗104
Kazakhstan 495 1.827 0.235 France 367 2.827 0.295
Kyrgyzstan 861 1.496 0.191 Germany 554 2.493 0.199
Laos 170 1.712 0.529 Greece 317 1.697 0.291
Lebanon 529 2.106 0.181 Hungary 448 2.148 0.219
Malaysia 342 1.654 0.294 Iceland 85 2.588 0.636
Mongolia 722 1.328 0.179 Ireland 293 1.554 0.208
Nepal 666 1.932 0.190 Italy 464 1.219 0.223
Occupied Palestinian Territory 427 2.433 0.276 Latvia 337 1.938 0.196
Pakistan 493 2.369 0.340 Lithuania 670 1.854 0.183
Philippines 1011 2.156 0.125 Luxembourg 179 2.063 0.277
Qatar 39 1.099 17.822 Macedonia 742 2.008 0.144
Russia 1435 2.228 0.218 Malta 286 1.568 0.220
Saudi Arabia 103 3.203 8.453 Moldova 1159 1.809 0.111
Singapore 533 1.810 0.298 Netherlands 206 2.174 0.326
South Korea 941 1.586 0.186 Norway 95 2.407 0.508
Sri Lanka 723 2.701 0.187 Poland 482 2.368 0.184
Syria 456 1.273 0.456 Portugal 361 2.020 0.201
Taiwan 486 2.015 0.206 Romania 480 2.525 0.157
Tajikistan 635 0.301 0.260 Serbia and Montenegro 1949 2.255 0.082
Thailand 204 3.643 0.595 Slovakia 209 2.520 0.343
Turkmenistan 169 0.625 0.529 Slovenia 204 1.346 659.144
United Arab Emirates 37 3.625 26.769 Spain 302 1.458 0.222
Uzbekistan 431 1.727 0.346 Sweden 401 1.807 0.183
Vietnam 292 2.926 0.580 Switzerland 56 3.057 8.771
Yemen 441 1.225 0.211 Turkey 393 2.361 0.331
Albania 974 2.027 0.121 Ukraine 692 2.267 0.180
Austria 205 2.395 0.304 United Kingdom 677 2.076 0.189
Belarus 693 1.988 0.173 Australia 204 1.970 0.328
Belgium 285 2.196 0.323 New Zealand 221 1.328 0.276
Bosnia and Herzegovina 687 2.520 0.132
Notes: standard errors obtained through bootstrapping with replacement, 200 replications.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Gallup World Polls.
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